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Subtraction arguments (SAs) support the view that there might 
have been nothing. The best-developed SA to date, due to David 
Efird and Tom Stoneham, is claimed by its authors to entail that 
there are worlds in which there are space-time points but no 
concrete objects: Efird and Stoneham hold that space-time points 
are not concrete and that a world made up from them alone 
contains nothing concrete. In this paper it is argued that whole 
space-times are concrete and subtractable, so that a subtraction 
argument commits us to a bolder conclusion: namely, that there are 
worlds in which there is no space-time (and nothing else concrete). 
This result has far-reaching consequences: it supports the view 
that there might have been no time; and constrains accounts of 
possible worlds. In the course of developing this revised 
subtraction argument, I counter suggestions (made by Ross 
Cameron, amongst others) that SAs are question-begging. !
Keywords: subtraction argument, metaphysical nihilism, material 
objects, concrete objects, space-time, possible worlds, empty world !!!
Some are inclined to believe that there might have been nothing—at least, 
that there might have been nothing concrete—but one might wonder 
whether any support can be given for this view beyond brute intuition.  Is 
there anything that might be said to persuade at least some of those 
undecided or in doubt with regard to whether this is a real possibility? It 
seems so. In his 1996, Tom Baldwin presented an argument for the claim 
that there might have been nothing concrete: the subtraction argument. 
Baldwin’s paper generated further discussion and debate, including an 
impressive sequence of papers by David Efird and Tom Stoneham in 
which the argument is developed and refined and its wider significance 









Subtraction arguments are intrinsically interesting, but they also have 
potential knock-on consequences. For one thing, as Efird and Stoneham 
make clear, a subtraction argument might set constraints on accounts of 
the nature of possible worlds: if there is a plausible argument for the 
claim that there might be nothing concrete, then any account of what 
possible worlds are which ruled out there being nothing concrete would 
at least incur a cost.  For another, subtraction arguments might have more 1
specific consequences in terms of committing us to the existence of 
possibilities of certain kinds: for instance, a subtraction argument might 
show that it is possible for there to be no time (that there are timeless 
worlds). In this paper I won’t say much more about these potential 
consequences; I’ll simply to try to gauge the persuasive force of 
subtraction arguments and give some consideration to the question of 
what sorts of possibilities they press us to acknowledge. !
1. Baldwin’s original argument !
Baldwin’s argument depends upon three claims: 
(A1) There might be a world with a finite domain of ‘concrete’ 
objects 
(A2) These objects are, each of them, things which might not 
exist 
(A3) The nonexistence of any one of these things does not 
necessitate the existence of any other such things (Baldwin 
1996, 232) 
The argument then runs roughly as follows. By A1, it could be that there 
are finitely many concrete objects. By A2, were it to be that there were 
finitely many concrete objects, then for any one of those objects, it could 
be that that object not exist. By A3, that would not require that something 
other than those original finitely many exist. And it seems that by 
repeating these steps we can infer by stages to the possibility of a world 
containing no concrete objects, establishing metaphysical nihilism (MN).  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 Here the distinction between accounts of what possible worlds are (accounts of the 1
nature of possible worlds), on the one hand, and determinations of what possible worlds 
there are (of what possibilities there are), on the other, is crucial. A successful subtraction 
argument would show that there is a possibility of a certain kind (e.g. that it is possible 
that there be no concrete things). It would constrain accounts of the nature of worlds by 
rendering implausible those accounts of the nature of worlds which cannot furnish a world 
which corresponds to that possibility. For example, if a subtraction argument shows that it 
is possible for there to be no space-time (and no space and no time) and Lewisian modal 
realism requires that each possible world is a maximal spatiotemporal sum, then LMR 
may be undermined because none of its worlds correspond to the crucial possibility. For 
more on how subtraction arguments might constrain accounts of the nature of possible 
worlds, see e.g. Efird and Stoneham 2005b, 21–3.
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Note that (A1) and (A2) are not strictly separate premisses: what we need 
is that it is possible that there be only finitely many concrete objects all of 
which are contingent. Claim (A3) is a plausible thesis about contingent 
objects. !
2. Efird and Stoneham’s revision of the argument !
Alexander Paseau (2002) objected to the argument as formulated, 
claiming that the premisses do not entail MN, because (A3) as stated by 
Baldwin leaves it open to counter-models. (The key point here is that 
(A3) as stated can be satisfied by models in which (a) each particular 
object that could exist is contingent, and (b) for any particular object, 
there is no one object which exists in all possibilities in which that object 
does not exist, but (c) there is no empty world—e.g. {a,b}, {a,c}, {b,c}, 
{a}, {b}, {c}.) 
David Efird and Tom Stoneham deal with this by providing the following 
replacement for (A3). This replacement, they plausibly claim, captures 
the spirit of subtraction (Efird and Stoneham 2005a, 309): 
(B)        ∀w1 ∀x(E!xw1 ⊃ ∃w2(¬E!xw2 & ∀y(E!yw2 ⊃ E!yw1))) 
That is, every particular possible world w1 is such that every particular 
thing x that exists at that world is such that there is another possible world 
w2 which is such that x does not exist at that world (w2), and everything 
that exists at that world (w2) is something which exists at w1. (Here object 
variables range unrestrictedly over concrete objects. See E&S 2005a, 306 
n. 12.) 
Now, it has been suggested that E&S’s formulation of SA is question-
begging. This is an important issue to which we will return later in the 
paper, but we can note here that (B) in and of itself is not question-
begging: it does not, on its own, entail MN. If there is no world 
containing only finitely many concrete objects, (B) might be true and yet 
there be no ‘empty’ world. 
One further concern that might be voiced at this point arises because (B) 
seems to be a thesis about worlds (see Efird and Stoneham 2005a, 320). 
This might seem to entail that the plausibility of (B) will be dependent 
upon views about the nature of worlds. Efird and Stoneham are 
concerned about this because they are interested in subtraction arguments 
acting as a constraint on accounts of worlds. I am concerned about it 
because it threatens to make other conclusions drawn from subtraction 
arguments (e.g. that there might have been no time) dependent upon 
particular metaphysical views on the nature of worlds, thus limiting their 
force, scope, and appeal. 
This concern can be addressed by framing a principle which fulfils the 
role of E&S’s (B) within a subtraction argument but which does not refer  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to or quantify over worlds, making it clear that the notion of 
subtractability applies to objects. This can be done by using plural 
quantification, as follows: 
Necessarily, if there are some (contingent) objects (that exist) X, 
such that every object (that exists) x is one of those objects X, then, 
for each object (that exists) y, it could have been both that y does 
not exist and that every object (that exists) z is one of those objects 
X 
(E&S make some use of what are effectively plural logic formulations in 
their 2005a, but do not bring the formulations to bear on this issue.) !
3. Characterizing concreteness: a first try !
So, it seems that we can formulate a valid and non-question-begging 
subtraction argument. But, crucially, in order to secure it as well 
supported by pre-philosophical intuition, we need to clarify the sense of 
‘concrete’ which applies and ensure that the premisses are intuitively 
plausible given that reading (see E&S 2005a, 310). 
Efird and Stoneham offer this initial characterization of concreteness 
(2005a, 310): 
An object x is concrete iff x is spatiotemporally located and x has 
intrinsic qualities 
E&S say that this classes space-time points as abstract: they admit that 
space-time points are spatiotemporally located, but claim that they lack 
intrinsic properties (2005a, 312). E&S claim that this is an acceptable 
result 
since a world which contained only spacetime points would 
contain nothing which had any intrinsic properties, and a world 
like that would be a world which might as well contain nothing at 
all from the perspective of the question, ‘Why is there something 
rather than nothing?’ (E&S 2005a, 312) 
This is dubious. I will present two arguments against the view. Before I 
do that, however, another issue needs to be addressed. !
4. Space-times and space-time points are contingent !
I will argue below that whole space-times are concrete things and 
subtractable. If whole space-times are to be subtractable, they will have 
to be contingent. Are they? 
It seems that, if there is one finite but unbounded space-time, then there 
might have been a greater number of such space-times. If that is right  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then at least some space-times are contingent, but there seems no reason 
to suppose that the first (or any other) should differ from the others in this 
regard. (This is one point at which views about the nature of possible 
worlds might seem to threaten to make a difference: it might seem that 
different results might be returned depending on whether or not Lewisian 
modal realism obtains with regard to worlds. The worry here would be 
that Lewisian modal realism rules out there being possibilities containing 
multiple finite unbounded universes. There is, however, no difference in 
the final result if LMR is correct. In Lewis’s metaphysics, whole space-
times—and space-time points—are world-bound individuals: strictly 
speaking, they exist at only one Lewisian possible world and are thus 
contingent by the lights of Lewis’s account of modality.) 
It might be suggested in response that, when we speak of ‘whole space-
times’, what we are in fact talking about are just sets of space-time points 
(this suggestion was made in conversation by Tom Stoneham). This 
threatens the brief argument for contingency sketched above, because, 
thanks to the fact that there are continuum-many space-time points, two 
or more finite but unbounded arrangements of space-time points could be 
made up from the same set of points as might make up one finite but 
unbounded arrangement. (This observation seems not to undermine the 
claim of contingency where a Lewisian view of worlds obtains, but it 
does need to be answered on other views of worlds.) There are four 
points we can offer by way of response to this ‘sets’ proposal. 
First, surely a whole space-time consists of space-time points standing in 
spatiotemporal relations, but if the ‘set’ claim were correct then it would 
seem to follow that a set of space-time points (on this view, a space-time) 
might form a single unified (spatiotemporal) arrangement in one 
possibility and exist in another possibility in an utterly fragmented state
—i.e. with none of its members standing in spatiotemporal relations to 
one another. It seems, therefore, that the set of points cannot be identical 
with the original unified space-time. 
Secondly, it seems that an arrangement of space-time points is a 
something; and that, where there are two such arrangements, one is, 
obviously, distinct from the other, so neither can be identical with the one 
there might have been. 
Thirdly, it seems that space-time points are themselves contingent things 
(on Lewisian GMR and on other views of worlds). There are three key 
observations we can make in support of this view. (I offer these 
observations in order of increasing force, ending with what seems the 
most forceful point in favour of the view.) (O1) It seems that the space-
time points of the actual world are 3+1 points (they are arrayed, we will 
assume, in three spatial and one temporal dimension), but it seems that 
1+1, 2+1, 4+1, … , worlds are possible (and perhaps even 3+2 and 3+3 
worlds). Further, it is plausible, for instance, that 3+1 points are distinct  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from 4+1 and 3+2 points, so that different points must be involved 
depending on which possibility is realized. (O2) It seems that there could 
have been a Newtonian world—a world in which a framework of spatial 
points endured through time—so that there would be, strictly speaking, 
no space-time points (that is, no items which are fundamental 
components of the spatio-temporal framework of the world and both 
spatially unextended and momentary). (O3) It seems that there could be a 
world with continuous branching time (so that it can be that, at each 
moment, time divides into indefinitely many branches), but branching 
time is not necessary. The cardinality of the set of points constituting 
such a densely branching world would be larger than the cardinality of a 
set of points needed to constitute a world without such branching. Now, it 
could be maintained that space-time points are necessary existents and 
the larger set of points exists (even if not all of its points are ‘used’ to 
constitute space-time), but we should note some further considerations 
which count against this move, as follows. (i) The resulting account 
posits a necessary truth which alternative accounts do not, namely that 
this very large set of space-time points exists (on this sort of cost 
associated with metaphysical theories, see E&S 2005b, 25–6). (ii) The 
proposed account identifies space-time with a set of space-time points, 
but now we encounter at least one puzzle. In those possibilities where 
time does not branch, some but not all of the points in the set are arranged 
to form something—a structure in which events do, or at least could, 
occur—but this something is not, we are to suppose, space-time (because 
space-time, according to the view under consideration, is the whole set of 
points, and not all of the members of that set are parts of the structure). 
One might also ask for an account of the difference, in such a possibility, 
between those points which are, and those points which are not, included 
in the structure. It would be very tempting—given the suggestion that the 
large set of space-time points exists necessarily, at least as abstract 
things—to adopt a Williamson-style view (Williamson 2002) and say that 
the points included in the structure are (contingently) concrete, whereas 
the ‘unused’ points remain abstract. But this, of course, would be to give 
up on the idea that space-time points are never concrete. (There are yet 
further potential costs to the view which has the large set of points 
necessarily existing: for one, it threatens to multiply hugely the range of 
possibilities, because there will be otherwise indistinguishable but 
distinct possibilities which vary only in terms of which points are 
included in a non-branching structure.) !
5. Two arguments against the view that a world comprised only of 
space-time points effectively contains nothing from the perspective of 
the question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ !
Recall that Efird and Stoneham said that  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a world which contained only spacetime points would contain 
nothing which had any intrinsic properties, and a world like that 
would be a world which might as well contain nothing at all from 
the perspective of the question, ‘Why is there something rather 
than nothing?’ (E&S 2005a, 312) 
I want to make two objections to this suggestion. (Both objections are 
plausibly telling, but the second is the more forceful.) 
(1) If space-times and space-time points are alike classed as 
abstract items, then a puzzle arises concerning their status—
and the generation of this puzzle or mystery casts doubt on the 
classification. Space-times and space-time points are 
contingent items (as argued above), so they do not number 
among the necessary abstract objects; but neither do they fall 
into the other class of abstract objects which seem intelligible 
(and which Efird and Stoneham countenance)—that is, things, 
like the centre of mass of the earth, which are parasitic upon 
concrete objects and thus exist only where there are concrete 
things to be parasitic upon. (At least, whole space-times do not 
seem to be parasitic in this way: space-time points might be 
thought to be parasitic—upon whole space-times.) 
(2) It seems it is simply not true that ‘a world which contained 
only space-time points would contain nothing which had any 
intrinsic properties’. Efird and Stoneham speak only about 
space-time points and simply overlook spatiotemporal regions 
and whole space-times. Spatiotemporal regions and whole 
space-times are spatiotemporally located, and, moreover, they 
do have intrinsic properties—as I’ll argue below. 
That space-time regions and whole space-times have intrinsic properties 
is supported by the following observations (the second observation listed 
is the more telling). 
First, in General Relativity, massive objects bring about changes to the 
geometry of space-time: that is, massive objects produce changes in the 
geometrical properties of space-time. (Space-time can vary in its 
‘curvature’: it can have an elliptical geometry—the sort of geometry 
exhibited by the relations between points on a sphere; it can have a ‘flat’ 
or Euclidean geometry; it can have hyperbolic geometry—such as 
exhibited by the relations between points on a ‘saddle’ shape; and, in 
addition, there can be variations in curvature across space-time.) These 
properties are not themselves a matter of space-time points standing in 
relations to massive objects; rather they are properties of space-time itself
—properties of space-time regions which plausibly supervene on 
relations between the space-time points which make up the space-time. 
Secondly, taking General Relativity to describe at least some ways things  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could be with regard to space-time, it is also notable that there are 
infinitely many ‘vacuum’ solutions to the equations of GR—solutions 
which don’t involve there being matter. In these different solutions there 
are variations in the geometrical properties of space-time (the ‘curvature’ 
of the space-time involved) in the complete absence of massive objects. It 
seems, then, that space-time might differ in its properties without 
anything else existing which is concrete: the relevant properties are ones 
which whole space-times can have when they are ‘lonely’. Interesting 
vacuum solutions include the Minkowski, de Sitter, and Anti de Sitter 
spacetimes (see e.g. Choquet-Bruhat 2009, 118–21).  Einstein himself 2
saw the existence of the de Sitter solution as highly significant. Einstein 
was for a long time attached to ‘Mach’s principle’—the claim that all 
gravitational fields can be attributed to material sources—and as a result 
felt that ‘[i]t would be unsatisfactory … if a world without matter were 
possible … it should be the case that the gµν-field is fully determined by 
matter and cannot exist without the latter’ (Einstein 1917, quoted in 
Janssen 2014, 202), but, in the wake of his exchange with Willem de 
Sitter and Felix Klein, Einstein abandoned this view and admitted the de 
Sitter world as a genuine possibility— ‘there … is a singularity-free 
solution to the gravitational equations without matter’ (Einstein 1918, 
quoted in Janssen 2014, p. 207). Reflecting on this stage in the 
development of his views, Einstein later said 
one should no longer speak of Mach’s principle at all. It dates back 
to the time in which one thought that the ‘ponderable bodies’ are 
the only physically real entities and that all elements of the theory 
which are not completely determined by them should be avoided. 
(I am well aware of the fact that I myself was long influenced by 
this idée fixe.) (Einstein to Felix Pirani, February 2, 1954; quoted 
in Janssen 2014, 207) 
For there to be one matter-free solution to the equations of GR would be 
significant in itself: since the de Sitter space-time has curvature 
properties, its existence shows that space-times can have these 
characteristics while ‘lonely’, making the characteristics intrinsic. That 
there are multiple vacuum solutions, varying in curvature properties, 
presses the point.  3
Worries might be raised here with regard to the role of the notion of an 
intrinsic property in the argument. The first worry concerns the difficulty  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 The Minkowski, de Sitter, and anti-de Sitter space-times differ in the values assigned to 2
the cosmological constant, but even with a fixed value for the cosmological constant there 
are still infinitely many vacuum solutions by choice of Cauchy data obeying the constraint 
equations.
 Thanks to Chris Fewster for helpful explanations of the physics here, particularly in 3
relation to vacuum solutions. For more detail on the significance of the de Sitter solution, 
see Janssen 2014, 167–70 and 198–208, esp. 207.
Here Goes Nothing
of providing an analysis of intrinsicality. Here it is worth noting what 
Efird and Stoneham say on the matter. They remark that, in the literature 
discussing how to analyse ‘intrinsic’, there is ‘general agreement over 
which properties are intrinsic’ and add that this ‘should give us 
confidence that the concept of intrinsicality is in good order and that it 
can be put to philosophically useful purposes, even if we struggle to 
explicate it’ (E&S 2005a, 311 n. 21). I agree with the thrust of this 
remark, but a second and related worry should be considered. It might be 
suggested that the claim that a whole space-time is a concrete item relies 
on a contentious case of alleged intrinsicality (curvature properties) and 
that it will, therefore, need to call on an analysis of intrinsicality for 
support. 
The status of curvature properties as intrinsic can be defended without 
appeal to a full-dress analysis of intrinsicality. The key point is simple: 
curvature properties are analogous to clear cases of intrinsic properties in 
material objects, such as (rest) mass. One might add that the fact that they 
are properties that a space-time might have in circumstances in which 
there are no objects that are both wholly distinct from it and concrete can 
be taken as indicative of their status as intrinsic, given that they plausibly 
do not fall into any of the types which make trouble for attempted full-
blown analyses of intrinsicality. (They are not trivially apt to be had by 
something lonely—as is the property of being lonely; nor are they 
disjunctive—as is being a lonely cube or an accompanied non-cube.)  4
Against these observations it might be suggested that consideration of the 
way in which curvature properties are defined raises significant concerns 
about their status. Let us grant for the sake of argument that we are 
obliged to pick out curvature properties in terms of subjunctive 
conditionals, along the following lines: 
A space-time region r has curvature property C iff were a light 
signal to be generated thus-and-so in r then it would propagate so-
and-thus 
It might be suggested that this undermines the claim of intrinsicality, by 
making curvature somehow relational. But this line is not at all 
convincing. First, the claim about definition at worst makes curvature 
properties analogous to dispositional properties like being water-soluble; 
but being dispositional does not entail being relational. Water-solubility is 
an intrinsic property: on plausible understandings of dispositional 
properties, a thing might be water-soluble even though there were no  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 Indeed, if being apt to be possessed in circumstances in which nothing distinct from the 4
object exists is taken to be a mark of intrinsicality, the status of curvature properties as 
intrinsic is more secure than many intuitively intrinsic properties of material objects: the 
existence of vacuum solutions to the equations of General Relativity makes a strong case 
for the possession of curvature properties by lonely space-times, whereas support for the 
claim that it might be that Lincoln exist and have, say, mass m and nothing else (concrete) 
exist and yet Lincoln possess mass is far weaker.
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water in existence. Secondly, it is plausible that dispositional properties 
have categorical bases—if, for example, item b is water-soluble, then it 
has some categorical property G in virtue of which it is such that, were it 
immersed in water, then it would dissolve. It might be suggested at this 
point that there is a significant distinction between the case of water-
solubility and the case of curvature, because in the case of water-
solubility the counterfactual has to be hedged (with ‘under standard 
circumstances’ or somesuch), indicating that there is a categorical 
property which ‘has a life independent of the counterfactual’; whereas, in 
the case of curvature, no such hedging is required. But this suggestion 
would be mistaken: the pattern of propagation of light signals within a 
space-time region will be sensitive to a whole range of potentially 
interfering factors (e.g. the presence of dense transparent media). !
6. Consequences of space-times being concrete !
If space-times are concrete items, what consequences might follow for 
subtraction arguments? 
It might be that the argument fails. It might be that (B) is intuitively 
compelling when the range of the quantifiers is restricted to exclude 
spatio-temporal regions and whole space-times, but fails to be compelling 
without this restriction. If this is how things turn out then we can perhaps 
subtract down to empty space-time but not get down to zero concrete 
items—though it would be a delicate question whether there were a 
viable version of the argument establishing that there can be empty 
space-time, or whether doubts over the truth of (B) given the sense of 
‘concrete’ we have made out would undermine even that restricted 
conclusion. 
Alternatively, it might be that space-times are subtractable (and that we 
can make an intuitive case for this). If this is how things turn out, we get 
additional interesting consequences from subtraction arguments. One 
consequence would be that there might have been no space-time. Some 
additional plausible premisses concerning space and time would then 
yield the conclusions that there could have been no space (at all) and that 
there could have been no time (at all)—that is, no space as an aspect of 
space-time and no space of any other form either, and likewise for time. 
It might be thought that if whole space-times were to turn out to be 
concrete items (by the lights of our best shot at a rational reconstruction 
of the notion of concreteness) then that would undermine the intuitive 
case for (B). Surely we balk at the subtraction of space-time? This is a 
nice question, and one that we will return to below, but I suspect that 
resistance here is based on a residual conviction that space and time 
comprise an immutable background for existence, radically different  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from the run of the material world—a conviction which is (a) 
independent of the intuitions which drive the subtraction argument and 
(b) undermined to at least some extent by the deliverances of empirical 
investigation (undermined, that is, by discoveries about the nature of 
space and time in the actual world). The revisions in our views brought 
about by Relativity should lead us to recognize that space-times are at 
least less different from things we intuitively class as concrete than 
seemed to be the case prior to Einstein, so that our conviction that 
concrete objects are subtractable should carry over to whole space-times, 
if our best shot at giving a general characterization of concreteness 
includes them. 
In the remainder of the paper I will argue that the revised SA should lead 
us to conclude that there could have been nothing—really nothing: no 
concrete objects, and no space-time. I first address a challenge to the 
account of concreteness to which we have appealed up to this point. This 
challenge threatens the status of whole space-times as concrete items. I 
will then turn, in the final section, to consider a further challenge to our 
revised SA and defend the subtractability of space-times. !
7. A problem for the subtraction argument, and a revised account of 
concreteness !
Efird and Stoneham’s subtraction argument faces a challenge which may 
impact on the status of whole space-times. 
The initial characterization of concreteness leads to a problem for (A1)—
the claim that there might be a world with a finite domain of ‘concrete’ 
objects. If space is continuous, then each extended concrete object will 
have infinitely many concrete proper parts. (This objection is raised by 
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra; see his 1997, 163.) 
Efird and Stoneham respond to the challenge by proposing a revised 
account of what it is to be concrete (2005a, 314–15): 
An object x is concrete iff x is spatiotemporally located and x has 
intrinsic qualities and x has a natural boundary 
This revised account seems to secure (A1). To see this, consider a block 
of gold sitting on a wooden shelf. This is an extended object. It is 
concrete. It (the block of gold) is ST located, has intrinsic properties, and 
it has a natural boundary (its boundary with the air around it and the 
wooden shelf that supports it). The items in the proper subregions of the 
region it occupies are not, however, concrete, by the revised account, 
because they lack (complete) natural boundaries. (For more on natural 
boundaries, see Sider 2001.) 
It seems this revised account of concreteness would rule out whole space-  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times as concrete items: both finite but unbounded space-times and 
infinite space-times also lack boundaries of any kind. 
The revised account is, however, open to objection. Consider a finite but 
unbounded world which is entirely filled by uniform matter. Intuitively 
this matter comprises a single concrete item, but the revised account rules 
that this is not a concrete object. (This objection is raised in Cameron 
2007, 275–6.) We can add further support to this objection by considering 
a case in which we consider first a world in which the matter almost fills 
the space-time. Here the revised account rules that there is a concrete 
object, but rules otherwise in the intuitively very similar case in which 
the matter does fill the space-time. 
A related objection concerns the fields of modern physics. Fields are 
plausibly concrete things:  they are spatiotemporally located, they have 5
intrinsic properties, and they are contingent (and they can produce effects 
in intuitively concrete things); and yet at least some fields do not have 
natural boundaries. Some fields do not come to an end; rather, they 
extend indefinitely and merely attenuate (the electric field surrounding a 
charge distribution of non-zero net charge extends to infinity, attenuating 
but never exactly zero, by Gauss’s law, even if the charge density 
vanishes outside a bounded region; a similar situation arises with 
Einstein’s field equations for the metric, under the standard assumption 
that this is to be a Lorentzian signature).  6
Efird and Stoneham respond to Cameron’s objection by amending the 
boundary condition as follows (Efird and Stoneham 2009a, 134): 
x is such that, if it has a boundary, it has a natural boundary 
In order to avoid complications about parts of the total boundary of a 
thing, we might use the following formulation: 
x is such that it has no non-natural boundaries (or boundary-
sections) 
With this further revision of the account of concreteness, whole space-
times are again counted as concrete. 
Note, in addition, that space-time regions (in the sense of extended proper 
parts of space-time) are not counted as concrete: they have boundaries, 
but it seems that these are not natural boundaries. This has the 
consequence that a possibility comprising only an empty space-time  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 Thanks to Chris Fewster for his helpful advice on the physics here.6
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contains only one concrete object—namely, the whole space-time.  7
So, this revised version of the account of concreteness classes whole 
space-times as concrete items, and rules that non-maximal space-time 
regions are not concrete, so that a world containing one whole space-time 
and no material objects contains only one concrete item. We are returned 
to the situation noted above: either whole space-times are subtractable—
and the subtraction argument commits us to the possibility of there being 
no space-time—or (B) fails when the range of its object quantifiers is 
taken to include whole space-times, and the subtraction argument fails as 
a consequence. !
8. Subtraction, basic components, and space-times !
Can anything be said to support the subtractability of whole space times? 
In this section I will mount a limited defence of the subtractability of 
whole spacetimes by pursuing the following strategy. I will consider the 
nature of our intuitive acceptance of (A1) and (B) and show that the 
stories we could tell on which (A1) and (B) are plausibly true do not 
provide any basis for drawing a distinction between intuitively central 
cases of concrete objects (medium-sized dry goods) and whole 
spacetimes with regard to subtractability. 
I want to consider what’s going on when we judge that (A1) and (B) are 
plausible. How do these judgements relate to thinking which, as far as  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 In his 2007, Cameron argues that (B) is false if the no-non-natural-boundary account of 7
concreteness is correct (see page 276)—or, at least, that if concreteness is understood in 
terms of the no-non-natural-boundary account, then the intuitive motivation for belief in 
(B) is undermined (see page 274). The argument involves a people—the Qube—who 
believe: (i) that there is an object with a natural boundary which is a god and which 
contains infinitely many further gods; (ii) that each god has an essential size, so that 
eroding the object destroys gods whose boundaries are encroached; and (iii) that, due to 
the powers of the gods, the object is proof against complete erosion. The Qube can share 
our intuition that the destruction of one object cannot magically entail the existence of 
another, but they deny (B) understood in terms of a no-non-natural-boundary account of 
concreteness: eroding the object will destroy a concrete (no-non-natural-boundary) thing, 
but result in some other thing coming to have a natural boundary and thereby coming to 
be concrete on the account given; and there’s no way to grind away all of the object. 
Cameron claims that the views of this people do not involve the denial of any 
fundamental metaphysical intuition (see page 278). The argument is ingenious, but it fails. 
As E&S note (2009, 135), the Qube should admit, surely, that it could have been that none 
of the gods existed. And if they deny this, then their resistance is simply a matter of their 
peculiar theology, and their refusal to accept (B) is based on denial of a deep metaphysical 
intuition that we hold—namely, that it is not necessary that an object composed of gods of 
this strange kind exists. (One might further object that the ‘contained’ gods in Cameron’s 
example do have natural boundaries: surely, a boundary which is such that encroaching 
upon it leads to the destruction of an object is natural. Note that mere containment inside a 
coating of some material of similar density does not prevent a boundary existing: e.g. a 
sphere of gold might be contained within a cube of platinum—see E&S 2005a, 314.)
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possible, avoids commitment to particular metaphysical theories? 
When we probe this issue we find something that may look somewhat 
dubious at first blush, but, when we get a clearer view of how the 
subtraction argument is supported by intuition we will see that if we are 
happy to endorse subtraction as it applies to paradigm concrete objects 
(dogs, planets, tables, etc.) then we should be happy to endorse the 
subtraction of whole space-times. 
When we ask ourselves whether there might be finitely many concrete 
objects it is natural to think something like ‘Well, there could be just 
three metal cubes’. That is, we base our judgement on thoughts about 
‘middle-sized dry goods’. 
When it comes to subtraction, it is intuitively plausible that the sorts of 
things we think about in relation to the issue of finite domains might have 
failed to exist without their non-existence entailing the existence of 
something ‘new’ (something not in the ‘starting domain’). But here we 
should recognize that these sorts of things can fail to exist in ways that do 
not require the non-existence of all their parts and stuff. A metal cube 
might fail to exist, though its parts and stuff exist, with those parts and 
that stuff scattered. Here it might be suggested that the mere intuition that 
one of those paradigm objects might not have existed does not ensure that 
the size of the domain of concrete objects could be reduced thereby.  This 8
suggestion is, of course, in one way superficial: we can take parts of 
(paradigm) extended objects to figure in the counts of conceived finite 
domains of concrete objects. This will require that larger extended objects 
are made up from finitely many smaller parts with natural boundaries, but 
that seems to be possible: there are natural boundaries between bones, 
ligaments, muscles, and so on within human bodies, for instance. 
Reflection on this issue reveals, however, that thinking about finiteness of 
domain and subtractability depends on intuitions about how things might 
be at smaller scales—scales smaller than those at which we find 
paradigm extended concrete objects, scales at which our intuitions might 
seem less secure. 
Now, one way to try to deal with concern about this ‘drive to the very 
small/to the level of constitution’ would be to say that we have an 
intuition which supports what might be called parts-and-all subtraction 
of medium-sized dry goods: that we have a basic intuition that any item 
of medium-sized dry goods and all of its constituent parts and stuff might 
have failed to exist without that entailing the existence of anything else. 
The problem with this, however, is that the required principle seems too  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 It seems that there are ways that things might be at the small scale which would put a 8
limit to subtraction, thus conceived. If mid-sized dry goods were disturbances in some 
fundamental fields, then ‘removing’ the mid-sized dry goods by stages while the fields 
remain in place would not be guaranteed to yield a situation in which there was nothing 
concrete. I’ll return to this case shortly.
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close to the desired conclusion, as Cameron points out (2007, 275): ‘if we 
can get rid of any concrete object and thereby get rid of all its parts, then 
why not simply, in one step, get rid of that object which is the 
mereological sum of all the concrete objects?’ It is worth saying that the 
argument is not rendered straightforwardly question-begging by the move
—an additional premiss would be required, to the effect that there is a 
concrete object which is the mereological sum of all the (other) concrete 
objects, in order to take us to the conclusion—but it does seem to weaken 
the force of the argument all the same. 
There is, however, an alternative response. Our conviction that there can 
be finitely many concrete things and our conviction that concrete things 
are subtractable are, I suggest, reliant on the thought that there are ways 
things could be at the smaller scale/with regard to the constitution of 
medium-sized dry goods which would allow for finite domains and 
subtractability. Let’s look at the various different ways things might be 
with regard to the constitution of material objects and consider (a) 
whether they allow for a finite domain and subtractibility and (b) what 
the individual cases have to tell us—if anything—about the status of 
space-times and their subtractability. It is worth noting in advance, and 
bearing in mind throughout the discussion, that all that is needed for the 
success of the SA is that there is one way that things might be which 
would allow for a finite domain of subtractable items. This already has a 
high degree of plausibility, but let’s consider the cases. 
There seem to be four ways that things could be with regard to the 
constitution of middle-sized material objects that we should consider:  9
(I) Everyday material objects are made up from finitely many 
point particles (extensionless atoms) 
(II) Everyday material objects are made up from finitely many 
extended atoms  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 It might be suggested that there is a tension between the approach adopted here and the 9
approach found earlier in the paper. In arguing for the status of whole space-times as 
concrete objects appeal was made to what modern physics tells us about space and time, 
but now appeals are being made to possibilities which may not be consistent with that 
physics. Views similar to those found in Callendar 2011 and Ladyman and Ross 2007 
might prompt someone to say that, though the earlier invocation of actual physics was 
laudable, this later wandering into areas that might not be consistent with the actual laws 
of physics is disreputable. The approaches adopted in this paper are, however, consistent. 
Physics was appealed to earlier to reveal the actual nature of space and time in a way that 
would lead some at least to expand their view of what is possible, but that is entirely 
consistent with appeals to possibilities which may lie beyond that region of logical space 
in which the actual laws of physics apply. Surely, in thinking about possibilities, our 
default position should be that ‘something is possible until proven guilty’. If something is 
consistent with the laws of physics, that may give us a stronger reason to think it possible, 
but only considering worlds with our physics seems shortsighted. (It’s worth noting, in 
addition, that possibility IV here may be one which is actually realized.) Thanks to an 
anonymous referee for this journal for pressing me to address this issue.
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(III)Everyday material objects are made up from finitely many 
discrete portions of homogenous stuff (‘drops’ or ‘blobs’ of 
matter) 
(IV)Everyday material objects are realized by fields 
(I) It is at least somewhat plausible that constitution by finitely many 
point particles is possible. Cameron suggests that our intuitions 
concerning point particles being a genuine possibility are not very much 
more secure than our (pre-argument) intuition that there might be nothing 
(Cameron 2007, 274–5). This seems to be at least something of an 
overstatement, but let us grant that there is some room for doubt as to 
whether point particles are genuinely possible, so that we should not rely 
entirely on this option in attempting to ground our SA. (We will return to 
this point about relying on particular potential forms of material 
constitution shortly.) With regard to space-times, the issue of the 
subtractability of point particles does not seem to bear one way or the 
other on the issue of whether space-time regions or whole space-times are 
subtractable. 
(II) It is plausible that constitution by extended atoms is possible. But 
similar (limited) doubts might be raised here as were raised under (I), so 
again we should not rest all of the weight of our argument on this option. 
With regard to the issue of space-times and space-time regions, it is worth 
noting that there are some key similarities between extended atoms and 
whole space-times, in the terms we’ve been considering: they are alike in 
being spatiotemporally extended, contingent, and homogenous. Given 
these similarities it is unclear what would be supposed to ground a 
distinction between the two in terms of subtractability. 
(III) A further putative possibility to consider is that of portions of 
homeomerous stuff. A discrete portion of such stuff could be spatially 
extended and have a natural boundary. Such a portion differs from an 
atom in that it is not required that its existence be all-or-nothing: a proper 
part of a portion might exist without the whole portion existing. And yet 
it seems legitimate to subtract a whole portion. Why? Well, it seems that 
an additional plausible principle is in play here: necessarily, if there exist 
some quantities of stuffs which exhaust the quantities of stuff (in the 
sense that there is no quantity of stuff which is neither one of them nor 
comprised of sub-quantities of one or more of them) and there exists a 
quantity of some particular stuff, then it’s possible for that quantity of 
that particular stuff not to exist and every quantity of stuff that exists be 
one of those quantities or comprised by sub-quantities of one or more of 
those quantities. Briefly: quantities of uniform stuff are subtractable (in 
this extended sense). Again it would seem that the similarities between 
quantities of stuffs and space-times are such that it is not clear what 
would ground a distinction between the two in terms of subtractability—
indeed, in this case it is natural to suppose that the similarities are such  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that if one takes portions of stuff to be subtractable then one should 
conclude that space-times are subtractable also. 
(IV) Constitution by a finite number of fields seems possible. (And, it 
seems, constitution by fields may be actual, which would seem to lend 
this option some additional weight.) At least some fields seem to be 
contingent items, so, in the absence of contrary argument, it would seem 
that constitution by a finite number of contingent fields seems possible. 
So it seems that there could be a finite domain of contingent material 
objects and fields. And again, it would seem that the similarities between 
fields and space-times are such that it is not clear what would ground a 
distinction between the two in terms of subtractability. 
In summary, there seem to be four putative ways for things to be with 
regard to the constitution of material things which would allow for a 
finite domain and subtractability. In each case there is some room for 
doubt over whether it is genuinely possible for things to be that way—
though in each case there is little ground for that doubt and the doubt is 
correspondingly weak. That there are four such ways is significant: as 
noted already, all that is needed for the success of the SA is that there is 
one way that things might be which would allow for a finite domain of 
subtractable items. 
It is worth noting in addition, that in three of the four cases, similarities 
(or at least, a lack of disanalogies) between the characters of the 
constituting items and whole space-times suggest that we should not hold 
a differential attitude towards the subtractability of space-times in 
comparison to other concrete objects—and the remaining case seems to 
be neutral on this issue. If one believes that a world of material objects 
can comprise a finite domain of concrete things, then one should believe 
that whole space-times are subtractable. !
9. Conclusion !
We have seen that careful consideration of the account of concreteness 
developed by Efird and Stoneham strongly suggests that whole space-
times should be classed as concrete items. Given this result we are faced 
with three main options: (i) reject Efird-Stoneham-style accounts of 
concreteness and search for an alternative account which rules whole 
space-times non-concrete; (ii) conclude that (B) is false, on the grounds 
that whole space-times are concrete but not subtractable; (iii) conclude 
that, even in the face of our observations about whole space-times, the 
subtraction argument remains intuitively plausible and, on that basis, we 
have reason to believe that there could have been no material objects and 
no space-time either. I have argued for (iii): space-time as we find it in 
actuality is a concrete object, it is contingent, and there is no obvious 
reason to think it any less subtractable than items of middle-sized dry  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goods, so, at the very least, if one found the subtraction argument 
persuasive prior to the recognition of the status of whole space-times as 
concrete items, then one should continue to find the argument persuasive 
in the wake of such recognition. In short, the revised subtraction 
argument presented here should lead us to conclude that there could have 
been nothing, and ‘less’ nothing than we thought previously—not only no 
material objects, but no smaller-than-universe-sized concrete items of any 
type, and no whole space-times either.  10!!!
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